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POTENTIAL COST SAVINGS AND COST AVOIDANCES 







In this project, I examine the current security cooperation and assistance efforts in 
the U.S. Africa Command area of responsibility with a particular focus on training of 
foreign military forces under 10 U.S. Code § 2282. Specifically, I analyze whether the 
cost of such training programs is cheaper using contracted personnel versus uniformed 
military personnel. The costs of contractor-provided training come from the Defense 
Security Cooperation Agency. Using the Department of Defense’s Financial Management 
Regulation, I priced the contractor provided training as if uniformed personnel had 
performed it to estimate the cost of provision using military personnel. Comparing the 
two estimates, I found that, in all cases, the contractor-provided price was significantly 
higher than the cost of uniformed personnel. While this study suggests that contracted 
services are not always cheaper than using military personnel, future research should 
incorporate better estimates of the opportunity cost of using uniformed personnel that 
may change the cost calculations.  
 
 vi
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I.  INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A.  OBJECTIVES ............................................................................................1 
B.  RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................1 
C.  METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................1 
D.  PROJECT OUTLINE ...............................................................................2 
II.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE DEFINED ................................................................3 
A.  BACKGROUND ........................................................................................3 
B.  DEFINITIONS ...........................................................................................3 
C.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT ..........5 
D.  STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS ...................................................6 
E.  DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS .......................................6 
III.  LITERATURE REVIEW .....................................................................................9 
A.  SECURITY COOPERATION ..................................................................9 
1.  How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in 
Developing Countries?.................................................................10 
2.  What Works Best when Building Partner Capacity and 
under What Circumstances? ......................................................14 
3.  Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the 
Return on Investment ..................................................................15 
B.  ECONOMIC SOURCES .........................................................................19 
IV.  DATA ANALYSIS ...............................................................................................23 
A.  CONTRACTOR PROVIDED DATA ....................................................23 
1.  Contract Structure .......................................................................27 
B.  COST OF MILITARY PROVIDED SERVICES .................................29 
1.  Personnel Costs ............................................................................30 
2.  Travel Related Costs ....................................................................31 
C.  COMPARISON OF COSTS ...................................................................33 
1.  Travel Costs ..................................................................................34 
2.  Personnel Costs ............................................................................35 
V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................39 
APPENDIX. ......................................................................................................................43 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................45 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................47 
 viii




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.  U.S. Military Aid Investment in Africa .......................................................5 
Figure 2.  Levels of Assessment .................................................................................11 
Figure 3.  Potential Data Sources for 1206 Evaluation ..............................................13 
Figure 4.  Services Provided by Contractor X ............................................................24 
Figure 5.  Total Costs of Operator Training in Africa by Contractor X .....................25 
Figure 6.  Contractor X Operator Training by Country .............................................26 
Figure 7.  Military Cost Breakdown ...........................................................................43 
 
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.  Growth of Security Cooperation/Building Partner Capacity Programs 
Since September 11, 2001..........................................................................16 
Table 2.  Training Engagements Performed by Contractor X ..................................28 
Table 3.  Billable Rate for Army E–7 to be Charged to Agencies Outside 
DOD ...........................................................................................................31 
Table 4.  Estimated Cost of Commercial Travel from North Carolina .....................32 
Table 5.  Weekly Per Diem Rates by Country and FY .............................................32 
Table 6.  Estimated Commercial Rental Car Rates ...................................................33 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xiii
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AOR area of responsibility 
APRI  Asia Pacific Regional Initiative  
ASFF  Afghanistan Security Forces Fund  
 
BPC building partner capacity 
 
CCF  Complex Crises Fund 
CCIF  Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund  
CLN contract line item 
COCOM combatant command 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CRSP Coalition Readiness Support Program 
CSF  coalition support funds  
CTFP  Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program  
CTPF  Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund  
CTR  cooperative threat reduction  
 
DCCEP  Developing Country Combined Exercise Program  
DISAM Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management 
DOD Department of Defense 
DSCA  Defense Security Cooperation Agency  
 
ERC  exercise-related construction  
ERI  European Reassurance Initiative  
 
FMF  foreign military financing  
FMS  foreign military sales 
FY fiscal year 
 
GPOI  Global Peace Operations Initiative  
GSCF  Global Security Contingency Fund 
 
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance  
IMET  International Military Education and Training  
INCLE International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement  
ITEF  Iraq Train and Equip Fund  
 
JCET  Joint Combined Exchange Trainings 
 
MBA Masters of Business Administration 
MERHC  Medicare-eligible retiree health care 
MODA  Ministry of Defense Advisors  
 xiv
NADR nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, demining, and related programs  
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act 
 
ODC  other direct costs 
OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense  
 
PKO  peacekeeping operations  
PPD Presidential Policy Directive 
 
SATMO Security Assistance Training Management Organization 
TDY temporary duty 
 
U.S.C. United States Code 






I would like to thank several people for their thoughtful and inspiring guidance 
and mentorship throughout the creation of this research project. First and foremost, I 
would like to thank Dr. Latika Chaudhary (Hartmann). Without her unique ability to 
motivate her students, this project would not have been completed. Her dedication to the 
educational process has been inspiring.  
I would also like to thank Dr. Ryan Sullivan. He graciously agreed to serve as co-
advisor on this project without having met me and with no knowledge of my academic 
ability. Even after learning of my abilities, he agreed to remain on the project. For this, I 
will be eternally grateful. 
Finally, I would like the thank the fellow students, too numerous to list, who have 
proctored and tutored me for the duration of my time in this program. You are each a 
credit to your service and I could not have finished without you. 
 xvi




This project delineates the difference between measuring the effectiveness of 
security cooperation programs used by the Department of Defense (DOD) and measuring 
the efficiency of the processes used to deliver those programs. Specifically, I provide a 
methodology for planners to assist in the “make or buy” decision of foreign military 
training programs. Similar to private firms, the “make or buy” decision involves tradeoffs 
between providing services in-house by service members (“make”) vice contracting for 
the service in the market (“buy”). By comparing the costs of contractor-delivered training 
with those delivered by organic military forces, I hope to show where opportunities exist 
for cost savings. Because security cooperation programs within the DOD exist in more 
than 180 different legislative authorities, it will be difficult to extrapolate the findings to 
all programs. That said, I hope that the proposed methodology will prove sufficiently 
adaptable to serve as a base for future planners. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Question 
Can significant cost savings be achieved through the contracted delivery of 
training to foreign militaries as part of the overall U.S. strategy of security cooperation? 
2. Secondary Question 
Is it possible to measure the efficiency of training programs from a security 
cooperation standpoint?  
C. METHODOLOGY 
After a literature review to determine the depth of the body of knowledge related 
to security cooperation and security assistance, I reviewed the available security 
assistance programs and selected programs that were representative of the data set for 
United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM). Contractor-delivered engagements were 
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priced assuming delivery of training by military personnel. The basis of the pricing 
determination was the DOD Financial Management Regulation, Volume 15, Chapter 7. I 
then compared the programs, using business analytic tools, to determine which programs 
were more efficient in the delivery of training. For the purpose of this assessment, 
“efficient” is defined as delivering successful training engagements for the lowest 
possible cost. I selected the segments of the programs (contractor- or military-delivered) 
that had the highest ratio of efficient to inefficient engagements. 
D. PROJECT OUTLINE 
Chapter I provides an overview of the project, research questions and 
methodology of this research project. 
Chapter II identifies the history of security assistance programs within the United 
States and identifies the significance of security assistance programs to U.S. foreign 
policy.  
Chapter III describes the past literature highlighting currently accepted measures 
of effectiveness and barriers to effective implementation. 
Chapter IV provides a detailed analytic case study of the Building Capacity of 
Foreign Security Forces program codified under 10 U.S.C. § 2282. This program is also 
known as the Global Train and Equip Program (Section 1206) and was previously found 
in Pub. L. No. 110-417 § 1206 and Pub. L. No. 112-81 § 1204. 
Chapter V concludes with recommendations on using this methodology for other 
programs, as well as opportunities for future researchers. 
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II. SECURITY ASSISTANCE DEFINED 
A. BACKGROUND 
Presidential Policy Directive 23 (PPD-23), signed by President Obama on April 5, 
2015, outlines the U.S.’ policy on security sector assistance. The policy fact sheet 
published by The White House states that due to the increasing frequency and complexity 
of threats encountered worldwide, it is imperative that the United States tailor its security 
effort in a manner that will provide the greatest return on investment (The White House 
Office of the Press Secretary, 2013). PPD-23 specifically challenged planners to “Be 
more selective and use resources for the greatest impact.” It demands that conscious 
decisions regarding resource allocation be made and its performance assessed against 
well-defined measures of effectiveness. 
Security cooperation and assistance programs are generally seen as a force 
multiplier across various government agencies. When used appropriately as a holistic 
approach to U.S. foreign policy, these programs have the potential to provide significant 
cost savings. This Masters of Business Administration (MBA) project examines current 
security cooperation and assistance efforts in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility 
(AOR) with a particular focus on training of foreign military forces. By looking at one 
specific authorization and appropriation available to the USAFRICOM Commander, I 
will attempt to determine whether there is a significant difference in the costs of this 
program when services are procured through contracted services rather than through the 
deployment of organic U.S. forces.  
Much of the research previously conducted on costs of foreign military sales and 
associated programs focused on the material solutions, such as delivery of major end 
items and sales of military equipment to other nations. The delivery of training services 
has all but been ignored in previous cost-savings studies.  
B. DEFINITIONS 
Security assistance includes any program through which the United States 
provides either material, training, expertise or institution building efforts to foreign 
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governments. In return, these governments provide consideration toward U.S. policies 
and objectives (Rand & Tankel, 2015). Security cooperation is actually much broader 
than this definition implies. It encompasses multiple cabinet level departments and sub-
agencies and countless congressional appropriations and authorizations. Security 
assistance includes programs administered by both the DOD and the Department of State.  
The DOD defines security cooperation as: 
Activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and 
enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve 
strategic objectives. It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense 
and security establishments, including all DOD-administered security 
assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that 
promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international 
armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; 
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and 
multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and 
contingency access to host nations. (Department of Defense, 2008) 
Another term that is often used in conjunction with the training of foreign military 
forces is “building partner capacity” (BPC). The term was coined during the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and is often inferred to mean those operations in which the United States 
provides training and equipment specifically designed to provide increased capability in 
the counterterrorism arena (Paul et al., 2013, pp. 8–9).  
The training of foreign military forces has long been a staple of U.S. diplomatic 
policy. Recent events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria have raised questions about both the 
efficiency and effectiveness of this arm of our security cooperation programs. The annual 
investment of military and police aid from the United States to all countries on the 
African continent from 2009–2016 is shown in Figure 1. The global total for these 
authorizations in fiscal year (FY) 2016 total is anticipated to exceed $18 billion (Center 
for International Policy, 2015a). With a planned investment of this magnitude, it is 
imperative that the government find the most efficient way to deliver the required 
services, and appropriate cost savings and cost avoidances where possible.  
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Figure 1.  U.S. Military Aid Investment in Africa  
 
Source: Security Assistance Monitor. (2015). U.S. military aid investment in  
Africa. Retrieved from http://securityassistance.org/data/country/military/country/2009/ 
2016/is_all/Africa 
Many of the programs included in this total fall outside the broad spectrum of 
activities normally associated with the DOD. RAND researchers have estimated that of 
the 165 programs that are included in the security cooperation umbrella, only 47 are 
relevant to counterterrorism and 64 to defense institution building activities. The 
remaining programs are related to counter narcotics, border security, or disaster relief. 
While the DOD may have some ancillary involvement, other cabinet agencies have the 
lead agency designation for these activities (Moroney, Thaler, & Hagler, 2013). 
C. SECURITY ASSISTANCE ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT 
The significance of security assistance programs to the desired diplomatic end-
state of the United States in regard to the African continent cannot be overstated. Every 
combatant commander within the DOD has a mandate to help partner nations with their 
efforts to build internal security capacity (Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, 
2015). Because the USAFRICOM does not have a contingent of assigned maneuver 
forces, it is much more reliant upon other programs to provide the requisite experience. 
The commander of USAFRICOM describes the key elements that enable him to be 
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successful as his posture, presence, programs, exercises, engagements and operations 
(United States African Command, 2015). 
D. STATE DEPARTMENT PROGRAMS 
Security cooperation programs are authorized under either Title 10 or Title 22 of 
the United States Code (U.S.C.). Programs that derive their authorities from 22 U.S.C. 
(Foreign Relations and Intercourse) are generally under the purview of the State 
Department. For DOD to be involved in Title 22 activities, it must partner with other 
governmental agencies (Moroney et al., 2013, p. 109). Examples of other agencies 
include the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development. While 
programs operated under Title 22 fall outside the scope of this research project, future 
researchers may want to compare the effectiveness of Title 22 programs against those 
administered under Title 10.  
E. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PROGRAMS 
Programs deriving their authorities from 10 U.S.C. (Armed Forces) do not 
specifically require partnering, but it is important to note that the programs are part of a 
much larger engagement plan for the country and will impact State Department efforts in 
that nation. Specific DOD programs include regional centers for security studies, drug 
interdiction programs administered under Section 1004, mine action programs, disaster 
response, and BPC programs under Section 2282. It is also important to note that because 
of the ability of these programs to impact other State Department led efforts in the partner 
nations, the conduct of these activities require Secretary of State concurrence to execute. 
In the post-9/11 world, the DOD saw a need for a more responsive form of 
security cooperation that saw prevention of conflicts, as much more cost-effective than 
responding to them. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before Congress 
in April 2008 and stated, “building partner capacity is a vital and enduring military 
requirement” Emergency Medical Services (Serafino, 2014). Programs administered 
under section 2282 fill that need.  
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In addition to meeting requirements, section 2282 programs are designed to be 
much more responsive to combatant commanders and their staffs. There have been some 
initial complaints about timeliness of deliveries but those are centered on articles and not 
services, such as training. 
The Security Cooperation Programs Handbook (FY 2015) published by the 
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM) describes the purpose of 
the building capacity of foreign security forces program as increasing the ability of 
partner nations to complete counter-terrorism and other military operations (Defense 
Institute of Security Assistance Management, 2015, p. 53). The inclusion of this section 
in the FY 2015 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) establishes the former 
Section 1206 of the FY 2006 NDAA as a permanent DOD authority. Since Section 2282 
includes all the provisions of the former Section 1206, the literature applicable to 1206 is 
also applicable to 2282. For the purpose of the literature review, I will use the two 
sections interchangeably. The FY 2015 NDAA authorized up to $350 million for building 
capacity programs under Section 2282.  
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to answer the primary research question of possible cost savings in 
training foreign militaries, it is important to examine the available literature on current 
program assessment. Much of the available body of knowledge of security cooperation 
and assistance programs can be divided into to two broad categories, those exploring the 
effectiveness of existing programs and those questioning the need for more programs. In 
order to keep within the scope of this research project, I will limit the security 
cooperation portion of my literature review to those sources that specifically address the 
Global Train and Equip Programs (1206). As mentioned previously, the use of section 
1206 is interchangeable with Building Capacity of Foreign Security Forces (10 U.S.C. § 
2282). 
In addition to the security cooperation portion, I will also review relevant 
literature from an economic body of knowledge related to the make or buy decision in 
government procurement. Specifically, I will address how this decision process is 
different in the public sector from private industry and cite examples of when it could be 
in the best interest to contract for security cooperation engagements. 
A. SECURITY COOPERATION  
The first general body of knowledge that I reviewed is dedicated to the concepts 
of security cooperation. Specific areas of concentration include the definition of security 
cooperation, the current process for determining appropriate security cooperation venues 
and assessment strategies. 
The assessment strategies for security cooperation are divided into two broad 
categories, those that assess the effectiveness of the program and those that assess 
efficiency. There is a rather deep body of knowledge that assesses effectiveness but an 
extensive study of measures of efficiency seems lacking.  
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1. How Successful Are U.S. Efforts to Build Capacity in Developing 
Countries? 
This RAND study attempts to provide a clear definition of the 1206 program by 
completing five main tasks: (1) identifying key stakeholders, (2) survey the stakeholders, 
(3) conduct a thorough analysis of the survey data, (4) collate the data, and (5) assist with 
the development of an assessment implementation strategy (Moroney, Grill, Hogler, 
Kennedy-Boudali, & Paul, 2011, pp. 4–6). 
The authors reference the Five Level Assessment Hierarchy developed by Rossi, 
Lipsey and Freeman as the foundation for their work (Rossi & Freeman, 1989). The 
hierarchy that the authors used is shown in Figure 2. They see the lower levels as 
foundational to the success of higher-level assessment. This suggests that for an effective 
assessment of program cost effectiveness there would already have to be positive 
assessments of the program need, design, implementation, and outcomes. This potentially 
explains why the body of knowledge on cost efficiency is lacking and why there is little 
assistance available for planners to assist with the “make or buy” training decision. 
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Figure 2.  Levels of Assessment 
 
Source: Moroney, J. D., Grill, B., Hogler, J., Kennedy-Boudali, L., & Paul, C. (2011). 
How successful are U.S. efforts to build capacity in developing countries? A Framework 
to assess the global train and equip “1206” program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND—
National Defense Research Institute. 
The study also argues significant challenges with the implementation of 
assessments. Causality is the biggest concern of the authors. They point out that it is 
difficult if not impossible to link specific programs administered under the Section 1206 
programs with the successful achievement of administration objectives within the partner 
nation.  
Section 1206 programs are further hampered by the lack of a dedicated 
automation system to track the assessment of 1206 programs. Most combatant commands 
have developed local databases to assist with the reporting requirements but these ad hoc 
systems are not designed to assess overall country impacts of 1206 programs (Moroney et 
al., 2011, p. 24).  
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For the purpose of this research, I am most interested in the level five assessment, 
cost effectiveness. The authors recommend the following three questions as a method of 
evaluating cost effectiveness: 
 How efficient is resource expenditure versus outcome realized? 
 Is the cost reasonable relative to the magnitude of the benefits? 
 Could alternative approaches yield comparable benefits at a lower cost? 
(Moroney et al., 2011, p. 14) 
Although the study is thorough in its design, it does not give explicit examples on 
how to answer these questions. Of particular interest to this research project is how to 
answer the first question. In Table 4–1 of the RAND study, a portion of which is 
recreated as Figure 3, the authors offers potential sources of data related to demand, 
resources, costs and objectives. By focusing on the cost data, it might be possible to 
formulate a make or buy matrix for 2282 planners (Moroney et al., 2011, p. 29). 
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Figure 3.  Potential Data Sources for 1206 Evaluation 
 
Source: Moroney, J. D., Grill, B., Hogler, J., Kennedy-Boudali, L., & Paul, C. (2011). 
How successful are U.S. efforts to build capacity in developing countries? A Framework 
to assess the global train and equip “1206” program. Santa Monica, CA: RAND—
National Defense Research Institute. 
RAND also noted that the government’s inability to communicate effectively is 
harming the ability to best implement 2282 programs. In the survey conducted for the 
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study, only 40% of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and combatant command 
(COCOM) level staffs admitted knowledge of other security cooperation programs. This 
lack of knowledge could cause inefficiencies in the selection of training resources and 
further highlights the need for a methodical process for the make or buy decision. More 
importantly, we could have multiple programs trying to achieve the same goals, 
unsuccessfully.  
2. What Works Best when Building Partner Capacity and under What 
Circumstances? 
In this RAND study, the authors explore best practices associated with security 
cooperation engagements. Unlike the 2282 study mentioned previously, this study did not 
focus on one specific program but was much more broad in scope. This allowed for a 
much more robust data set for evaluation. Several of the study’s findings will be used in 
the analysis for this research project.  
Paul Clarke et al. (2013), the study’s authors, find a strong correlation between a 
partner nation’s ability to provide its own funds and the strength of its economy with 
success of proposed capacity building programs (p. xvii). This might indicate that 
contracted teams, or military teams whose costs are reimbursed by partner nations might 
enjoy more success than solely U.S. funded deployed teams. In order to explore this 
theory the authors propose the hypothesis “The way in which the United States plans, 
resources, and executes building partner capacity influences effectiveness” (p. 3).  
Of note in this study is the discarded hypothesis “Military-to-military contact is 
more effective in building relationships than contractor-to-military contact.” The authors 
do not offer specifics about each discarded hypothesis but do state that in general 
hypotheses were discarded “because we were unable to consistently obtain data of 
sufficient detail across all cases” (Moroney et al., 2011, p. 33). This discarded hypothesis 
only addresses the effectiveness of the training engagement and not the efficiency with 
which it was delivered. That is, assuming that both military-to-military contact is equally 
effective as contractor-to-military contact, which one is the least expensive to deliver?  
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Paul’s study is ambitious in its scope. It attempts to cover the entire spectrum of 
BPC missions and authorities over a twenty-year period. While the authors do address 
some of the shortcomings associated with the time span and changes in other exogenous 
events, they fail to address specific differences in program resourcing strategies (Paul et 
al., 2013, p. 47). These differences form the foundation of the question of efficiency of 
training delivery.  
Also not addressed by Paul or his team are the regional concerns that would 
impact the selection of contracted teams over U.S. military teams. Although it can be 
inferred from Parent Hypothesis 4 (“The broader context (the geopolitical situation, other 
neighbors and partners) influences the effectiveness of BPC”) Paul never states that 
decisions other than efficiencies can and must be used to determine the best resource 
strategy (Paul et al., 2013, p. 72). Political concerns and instability in Libya may lead to 
the use of contractors for engagements in that country even though the less expensive 
option might be to deploy U.S. forces.  
Like Moroney et al., Paul does an adequate job of assessing measures of 
effectiveness but fails to address the selection process to determine the most efficient 
means to deliver the training. 
3. Security Cooperation and Assistance: Rethinking the Return on 
Investment 
Rand and Tankel (2015) begin with an examination of the recent history of 
security cooperation programs within the U.S. government. They are among the first in 
the body of researchers to note that current level of engagement is unsustainable (p. 2). 
As the United States continues to draw down the end strength of its military it will 
become even more important to find the most efficient way to deliver a return on 
investment for security cooperation programs. The authors point out that policymakers 
and security cooperation planners must ask what the U.S. end state is and how we can 
achieve a return on the investment we make in building partner capacity (p. 2). 
The growth of security assistance programs since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 is shown in Table 1. Rand and Tankel (2015) point out that while 
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this gives planners more tools to use it also causes inherent problems. Each of these 
programs comes with its own set of rules and regulations that govern how and what must 
be paid by the partner nation. This plethora of programs leads to “the propensity to 
deploy security assistance and cooperation based on which authorities are available or 
most flexible, as opposed to choosing the right program for the problem” (Rand & 
Tankel, 2015). In addition to choosing the correct program, a detailed analysis is required 
to ensure that the most efficient method of delivery is used.  
Table 1.   Growth of Security Cooperation/Building Partner Capacity 
Programs Since September 11, 2001 
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Counter-Drug Assistance (Two authorities: Section 
1004, Section 1033) Title 10 
Joint Combined Exchange Trainings (JCET) Title 10 
Combatant Commander’s Initiative Fund (CCIF) Title 10 
Training and education programs 
Title 10 and 22 depending 
on program 
Warsaw Initiative Fund Title 10 



















































Train and Equip (Section 1206) 
Reauthorized as Building Capacity of Foreign 
Security Forces (Section 2282) 
Title 10 
Global Lift and Sustain Title 10 
Support to Foreign Forces (Section 1208) Title 10 
Logistics Support to Foreign Forces (Section 1210) Title 10 
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PROGRAM LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund (CTPF) Title 10 
Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) Title 10 
Exercise-related programs 
E.g. Developing Country Combined Exercise 
Program (DCCEP), Exercise-Related Construction 
(ERC) 
Title 10 
Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program Title 10 
Coalition Support Funds (CSF), including Coalition 
Readiness Support Program (CRSP)—technically 
reimbursement, not assistance Title 10 
Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) Pooled State/DOD fund 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) Title 22 
Complex Crises Fund (CCF) Title 22 
































































Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) Title 10 
Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) Title 10 
Authority to Provide Assistance to the Vetted 
Syrian Opposition (Section 1209) Title 10 
European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) Title 10 
Asia Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) Title 10 
Adapted from: Rand, D., & Tankel, S. (2015, August 5). Security cooperation and 
assistance. Retrieved from http://www.cnas.org/security-cooperation-assistance#.VhPv 
UjZdEus 
Rand and Tankel (2015) deliver 10 specific policy recommendations that focus on 
creating a more effective program but not necessarily a more efficient one. The 
recommendations are:  
1. Consolidate, rationalize, and rebalance the many security assistance and 
cooperation authorities.  
2. Undertake regional reviews of security assistance and cooperation 
programs.  
3. Increase the use of regionally appropriated funds for assistance and 
cooperation where appropriate.  
4. Improve interagency coordination and enhance State’s capacity to manage 
security assistance programs.  
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5. Focus on specific implementation goals for the PPD 23 to connect military 
and non-military goals.  
6. Revise IMET and focus more on professionalizing military and civilian 
security institutions.  
7. Invest in a consistent policy for promoting accountability among U.S. 
security partners.  
8. Invest early and focus more on “headware” than “hardware” for military 
BPC.  
9. Use positive conditionality proactively.  
10. Develop a systematic, interagency method of tracking outcomes (p. 24).  
While the majority of the recommendations do not specifically address the 
selection of the most efficient means of delivery it can be inferred by some of the 
recommendations that the authors did consider efficiency.  
In their explanation of their first recommendation, the authors suggest that the 
current system lacks coordination particularly in the selection of appropriate programs 
(Rand & Tankel, 2015, p. 24). The authors mention that the overall security cooperation 
effort would benefit from consolidation of the various authorities. It also mentions the 
selection of appropriate regional budgetary funds. This is one of the few discussions in 
the literature that mentions selection of funding as a consideration. In addition to the 
proper selection of funding, the proper selection of training team type is crucial.  
The third recommendation, “increase the use of regionally- appropriated funds for 
assistance and cooperation where appropriate” also suggests that the selection of 
contracted personnel should be considered. Rand and Tankel (2015) explain that U.S. 
assistance could overwhelm some sub-regional institutions (p. 25). The presence of 
uniformed military in some these institutions may do serious harm to the overall goal of 
the program making military to military engagement much less efficient overall. 
Even though Rand and Tankel conclude by stating that future administrations are 
extremely likely to continue to rely on security cooperation efforts, there is little 
discussion on making the programs more efficient (2015, p. 28).  
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B. ECONOMIC SOURCES 
In addition to literature covering the basics of security cooperation, I reviewed 
literature concerning the economic aspects of the make or buy decision process. 
Specifically, I explored the differences of the make or buy decision-making process in 
public sector organization compared to private corporations. 
The determination of the make or buy decision is vastly different in government 
than it is in private sector operations. The decision is particularly different in the realm of 
contracting for services. In this article, Shleifer (1998) offers a brief historical look at the 
theories for and against the state ownership of “strategic” sectors (p. 134). While training 
may not be considered a strategic sector along the lines of the steel, energy, 
telecommunications and financial services mentioned in the article, the training of foreign 
militaries is a strategic component of the execution of foreign policy and therefore 
relevant to this research. 
Shleifer (1998) initially offers the idea that private execution of services is in the 
best interest because they are often a source of innovation and increased efficiency 
(p. 135). While this may be a true statement in a variety of stateside service contracts, the 
ability of a contractor to innovate in the delivery of foreign military training is diminished 
because of the likelihood of disrupting policies and interfering with the delicate nature of 
international relations. This seems to be at odds with Shleifer’s argument that a reduced 
role in production by the government is apparent (p. 136). 
In the next section of the article, Shleifer (1998) tackles “The Desirable Scope of 
a Benevolent Government.” He examines the public education system and compares the 
ideas of selectivity of private schools and the implications of the voucher system. While 
not a perfect correlation to foreign military training, Shleifer (1998) does offer that “With 
perfect contracting and regulations, there is no difference between state and private 
provision of goods and services” (p. 137). Perfect contracting does not exist in even the 
most mundane of environments. It has no chance in the dynamic world of foreign 
relations. Often the subject being requested by a partner nation will change and evolve 
over the course of the contract period. Changes in international law or state priorities will 
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dictate changes to the scope of the contract. The U.S. domestic election cycle also will 
have influence on the choice of nations with which we interact. The utopian world of 
“perfect contracting” will never exist. 
The idea from the Shleifer (1998) article that is most exportable to this research is 
the idea of “non-contractible quality” of a contract line item. A non-contractible quality is 
any unmeasurable or intangible expectation of the deliverables from a contract. Shleifer 
offers examples, such as treatment of inmates by a prison staff, drinkability of water from 
a utility company or the innovation of a car company (p. 137). For a foreign military 
training engagement, types of non-contractible quality could include ability to integrate 
with a coalition staff, interoperability with U.S. forces and strength of relationships built 
at the tactical level.  
The need for a positive return on these non-contractible quality issues is usually 
more important than the cost reductions that would be associated with contracted service 
suppliers. Shleifer uses the example of a private school that has been incentivized for cost 
savings using less qualified teacher aides instead of fully qualified teachers (Shleifer, 
1998, p. 138). As devastating as the consequences of that would be, imagine the outcome 
of substituting a less qualified instructor when instructing on the law of war or when 
teaching the senior staff of another country’s armed forces.  
Shleifer (1998) finally offers a set of circumstances for which it is superior for the 
government to provide the service over a contract provider.  
1. Cost reductions would result in an unacceptable drop in non-contractible 
quality 
2. The need for innovation is non-existent or unimportant 
3. There is little competition 
4. The need for reputation within the market is weak (p. 140) 
A combatant commander’s security cooperation plan exists in the world described 
above and is a perfect example of when a service should be provided by the government. 
First, utilization of less than qualified personnel to save shareholder revenue could result 
in training that violates international law and lead to human rights violations. Second, 
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contractor innovation not only is unimportant, it is discouraged. Third, due to vetting of 
service providers by various government agencies, security clearance and travel clearance 
requirements and visa processing times the ability to change contractors is greatly 
diminished.  
Shleifer (1998) ends this portion of the article with an extremely important caveat 
that is particularly applicable to security cooperation activities. He states that in situations 
where the government does not know the true nature of the requirement and neither cost 
efficiency nor innovation are important, then government provision of the service is 
probably the most beneficial route (p. 141).  
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS 
I first selected the COCOM that would most freely lend itself to scrutiny of 
security assistance programs. FY 2016 has seen a significant increase in the requested 
funding for assistance to African nations. Since DoS does not divide the globe in 
COCOMs as DOD does, it is difficult to isolate the total amount of funding attributed to a 
COCOM, but in the period from FY 13 to FY 16, estimates suggest that funding levels in 
Sub-Saharan Africa will increase from $112 million to $1.13 billion. Similarly, funding 
for Middle East and North African countries increased by approximately 20% to a total of 
$2.28 billion (Center for International Policy, 2015b). Because of the growth of U.S. 
interests in Africa and the subsequent growth of security assistance funding being 
directed toward USAFRICOM, I selected USAFRICOM for further analysis.  
After selecting the COCOM, it was necessary to solicit the data from both 
government and contractor sources. In order to assess the current process, it was 
necessary to find data sources that were willing to share enough data to make a 
statistically significant sample. Because government contractors have an obligation to 
their shareholders to protect proprietary data, such as cost and pricing data associated 
with government contracts, finding willing donors of information proved challenging. In 
order to preserve trade secrets associated with the services provided, I have agreed to 
redact the name of any contractor providing data and to limit the amount of data released 
as a part of this study. 
A. CONTRACTOR PROVIDED DATA 
Contractor X provided a data set indicating that they have provided services in 
four different categories: field service representative, installation, maintenance and 
operator training. Figure 4 shows the contracted cost services by type billed by the 
contractor to the government. 
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Figure 4.  Services Provided by Contractor X 
 
 
I determined that it was not appropriate to include field service representative 
services in the evaluation because of the proprietary nature of the services that these 
individuals provide. Due to limitations on technical data rights and contract limitations, 
the government is unable to provide these specific services. Similar arguments can be 
made for the installation services. Although it is feasible for military service members to 
provide some maintenance training, the total spent on this line was only 0.36% of the 
total expenditures. I did not consider this amount significant enough to include in the 
analysis. For these reasons, I focused only on the operator training services provided by 
Contractor X. 
Figure 5 shows the total expenditures by FY of Contractor X provided operator 
training services for which the government has paid a final invoice. There is an 
approximate $7.5 million discrepancy between the two totals for operator training. This 
discrepancy represents those services that have not been invoiced to the government. 
They are listed by the contractor as either pending or underway. Since final cost and price 
data is not available for these services they have been excluded from the analysis.  
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Figure 5.  Total Costs of Operator Training in Africa by Contractor X 
 
 
Contractor X provided these completed services in ten African nations as 
indicated in Figure 6. There are several possible explanations for the jump in the level of 
contracts for FY 15. The budgeting process employed by the government is completed 
using a five-year cycle. Since USAFRICOM began operations in 2009, FY 2015 would 
be the first year that its own priorities were captured as a part of the budgeting process. 
FY 15 was also the year that section 2282 became a permanent appropriation authority so 
there was a department wide push to increase the use (Serafino, 2014).  
  
 26
Figure 6.  Contractor X Operator Training by Country 
 
 
The contractor priced the services in accordance with the indefinite delivery 
indefinite quantity contract vehicle that was in place for world contracts. Under this 
arrangement, the contractor provided the required services for the same price regardless 
of place of performance.  
The figure suggests that the countries of Burundi, Niger, and Uganda receive a 
greater proportion of overall training funds than other African nations. The training 
reflected in this graph is specific operator training on a specific piece of specialized gear. 
Other contractors operating on the African continent could be providing services at 
greater levels to the other countries annotated in Figure 6 or to other countries not 
reflected here. Nations, such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, or Mauritania, appear to be 
underrepresented. Reasons for this may be that these nations do not possess large 
numbers of the equipment for which Contractor X provides training. Their militaries may 
not be ready for the specific level of training that the contractor provides. It is important 
not to lose sight of the fact that the level of spending within an individual country does 
not necessarily reflect the efficiency of the training delivery.  
Additionally, one of the engagements listed in Niger in FY 15 was a yearlong 
engagement. This is the only yearlong operator training engagement listed by Contractor 
X and skewed the total cost of data reported for Niger. The other yearlong engagements 
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listed by Contractor X were field service representative type engagements and excluded 
from this analysis. 
1. Contract Structure 
The contract was structured as a multiple award task order contract with multiple 
contract line items (CLNs). Contractor X offered training packages that varied according 
to the number of trainers required and the number of weeks of training. A standard 
package for operator training is two personnel for a two-week period, but each training 
engagement is tailored to the needs of the customer country. Table 1 shows the 
breakdown of trainers and length of engagement used for the analysis. 
  
 28
Table 2.   Training Engagements Performed by Contractor X 
Country 
Service 
Type Manpower Duration FY Cost 
Niger Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $ 98,397.36 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $ 85,425.00 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 1 Week 13 $ 70,797.18 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 
Burkina Faso Ops Training 1 Eng, 1 Trans 1 Week 14 $ 66,176.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 1 Week x 5 14 $ 69,409.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 1 Week x 5 14 $ 69,409.00 
Burundi Ops Training 1 Eng 1 Trans 2 Weeks 14 $ 96,468.00 
Chad Ops Training 2 Eng 3 Weeks 14 $146,385.00 
Kenya Ops Training 2 Eng 3 Weeks 14 $117,108.00 
Mauritania Ops Training 1 Eng 2 Weeks 14 $ 47,096.00 
Mauritania Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 14 $ 96,468.00 
Niger Ops Training 2 Eng 4 Weeks 14 $142,573.00 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 14 $115,458.00 
Burkina Faso Ops Training 2 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $121,137.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,457.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,457.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $142,226.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,493.00 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,521.25 
Burundi Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,492.50 
Djibouti Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,521.25 
Djibouti Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,492.50 
Ethiopia Ops Training 1 Eng 6 Weeks 15 $111,816.00 
Ethiopia Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $ 94,794.00 
Mauritania Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $ 91,642.00 
Niger Ops Training 1 Eng 1 Year 15 $591,213.00 
Niger Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $ 94,817.00 
Niger Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $ 94,817.00 
Niger Ops Training 2 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $121,137.00 
Uganda Ops Training 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,458.00 
Uganda Ops Training 1 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $243,403.50 
Uganda Ops Training 1 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $243,403.50 
Uganda Ops Training 1 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $ 52,679.00 




Prices listed were quoted in the base year of the contract award, FY 13. Agreed 
upon prices were adjusted annually by an escalation factor of 3.44% as a negotiated 
contract condition. The CLNs can be further broken down into labor rates for the period 
of instruction, labor rates during required travel, travel costs for transportation, travel 
costs for per diem, and other direct costs. In addition to the base costs associated with the 
contracts, Contractor X is entitled to a 25% premium for countries identified as hazardous 
duty locations and a 50% premium for countries identified as war zones. For the period of 
the analysis, the countries of Burundi, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritania, 
Niger, Somalia, and Uganda qualified as hazardous areas. No countries in the 
USAFRICOM AOR qualified as war zones. 
Since the analysis occurs over multiple year, I selected a base year of FY 15 and 
normalized all other years’ data from “then year” data to FY 15 data. Those totals are 
reflected in Table 2. In order to normalize the data, I used the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Inflation Calculator tool to determine the value of $1.00 of “then year” money in 2015 
rates. Using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to compute the change in value, I 
determined that the value for $1.00 of 2013 money became $1.02 in 2015. For 2014 and 
2015, there was no change in the value (CPI Inflation Calculator, 2015). For the 2013 
values, I multiplied the contracted price supplied by Contractor X by the $1.02 to arrive 
at the totals listed in Table 2. 
B. COST OF MILITARY PROVIDED SERVICES 
In order to properly compare the costs of contracted provided services, I manually 
computed the cost of services for a military organization to provide the same level of 
services. In order to establish a baseline level of military support the following 
assumptions were used in determining prices. 
The military trainers would have to be equally effective at delivering the course 
content as the contractor personnel. Within the Army, the noncommissioned officer is 
primary trainer of Soldier tasks (U.S. Army, 2015). For this reason, it is assumed that the 
trainers selected to conduct this training will be noncommissioned officers. Since the 
training will happen in an autonomous setting without a significant amount of leadership 
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involvement, it is essential that the team of instructors will include organic leadership and 
maintain a level of maturity that may not be developed in more junior Soldiers. For these 
reasons, I assumed that training would be conducted by senior noncommissioned officers 
of the rank of Sergeant First Class (paygrade of E7).  
The U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization 
(SATMO) is a brigade-sized unit assigned to Fort Bragg, North Carolina. They are tasked 
with providing the Army’s portion of training foreign nations in response to requests 
from partner nations and requirements received from Defense Security Cooperation 
Agency (DSCA) (U.S. Security Assistance Training Management Organization, 2015). I 
have assumed that SATMO will provide the services requested and that all Soldiers’ 
temporary duty (TDY) travel will originate at Fort Bragg. This assumption will be used 
to calculate actual travel costs. 
Soldiers are considered salaried workers and are paid the same rate for travel time 
as they are for time spent preparing and delivering training. Military provided services 
will not have separate personnel costs for travel time and time spend performing 
instructional duties.  
Contractor X provided information concerning other direct costs (ODC). The 
contractor explained that these costs included costs to print materials, special tools, or 
equipment required for training and costs associated with visas and passports. Since 
military trainers would incur the same costs, I assumed these costs to be irrelevant and 
excluded them from the analysis. The totals in Table 2 do not include the ODC. 
1. Personnel Costs 
Personnel costs for comparable military personnel were computed using the 
appropriate FY military personnel composite standard pay and reimbursement rates in 
accordance with Volume 15, Chapter 7 of the DoD Financial Management Regulation 
(Department of Defense, 2011). The personnel rates for the E–7 paygrade are recreated in 
Table 3. The daily rate was computed by applying a factor of 0.00439 to the published 
annual costs. The daily rates were then multiplied by 7 to compute the weekly rate. Since 
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Contractor X provided duration data in weeks, I will use the weekly computation rate 
normalized to FY 15 dollars as described earlier in this paper. 
Table 3.   Billable Rate for Army E–7 to be Charged to Agencies Outside 
DOD 
 FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 
Army E–7 Paygrade 
Annual Rate $ 115,182 $ 117,182 $ 116,902 
Army E–7 Paygrade 
Daily Rate $ 505.65 $ 514.43 $ 513.20 
Army E–7 Paygrade 
Weekly Rate $ 3,539.54 $ 3,601.00 $ 3,592.40 
Normalized Weekly 
Rate  $ 3,610.33 $ 3,601.00 $ 3,592.40 
 
In addition to the base pay, military members assigned to certain countries are 
authorized hazardous duty location pay. For the majority of countries listed in Table 4, 
the monthly amount is paid is $100.00. For the countries of Burkina Faso and Mauritania, 
the amount is $150.00. These amounts are paid as a full monthly entitlement for spending 
any period of the month in the country. The total amount spent cannot be prorated.  
2. Travel Related Costs 
Military costs are computed for each individual location that the training occurs 
in. This varies greatly from the commercial practice of pricing contracts for worldwide 
execution. Because historic indexes of commercial flight prices are not readily available, 
I have priced the flights using current commercial prices from North Carolina to each 
country and then applied the appropriate CPI computations for price normalization as 
described previously.  
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Table 4.   Estimated Cost of Commercial Travel from North Carolina  
 
Country Airport City Airport 
Code 
FY13  
(in FY 15 $) 
FY 14 FY 15 
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou OUA $ 1,624.84 $ 1,658.00 $ 1,658.00 
Burundi Bujumbura BJM $ 2,670.50 $ 2,725.00 $ 2,725.00 
Chad N’Djamena NDJ $ 2,365.72 $ 2,414.00 $ 2,414.00 
Djibouti Ambouli JIB $ 1,767.92 $ 1,804.00 $ 1,804.00 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa ADD $ 1,309.28 $ 1,336.00 $ 1,336.00 
Kenya Nairobi NBO $ 1,485.68 $ 1,516.00 $ 1,516.00 
Mauritania Nouakchott NKC $ 2,744.00 $ 2,800.00 $ 2,800.00 
Uganda Entebbe EBB $ 1,495.48 $ 1,526.00 $ 1,526.00 
Somalia Mogadishu MGQ $ 3,054.66 $ 3,117.00 $ 3,117.00 
Niger Niamey NIM $ 1,663.06 $ 1,697.00 $ 1,697.00 
 
In order to compute weekly per diem costs for each location, I determined the 
daily per diem rate in effect in each country on October 1 of the appropriate FY (Defense 
Travel Management Office, 2015). I then multiplied the daily rate by 7 to determine the 
appropriate weekly rate that is reflected in Table 5. 
Table 5.   Weekly Per Diem Rates by Country and FY 
Country Location FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou   $1,806.00 $1,862.00 
Burundi Bujumbura $1,309.00 $1,309.00 $1,309.00 
Chad N’Djamena $2,653.00 $2,618.00 $2,289.00 
Djibouti Ambouli $2,387.00 $2,387.00 $2,401.00 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa $2,800.00 $2,800.00 $2,800.00 
Kenya Nairobi $2,870.00 $2,870.00 $2,870.00 
Mauritania Nouakchott $1,477.00 $1,533.00 $1,428.00 
Uganda Entebbe $2,205.00 $2,380.00 $2,380.00 
Somalia Mogadishu $1,456.00 $1,456.00 $1,456.00 
Niger Niamey $1,232.00 $1,407.00 $1,232.00 
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The final transportation related cost is payment of rental cars. Like the flight costs 
determined previously, there is no definitive source of historical prices for rental vehicles 
in African countries. I used commercially available prices in effect in November 2015 
and normalized the prices for 2013 pricing. The weekly costs for one economy vehicle is 
listed in Table 6. For those countries that do not list a price, there are no rental facilities 
available within the country.  
Table 6.   Estimated Commercial Rental Car Rates 
Country Location FY 13 FY 14 FY 15 
Burkina Faso Ouagadougou $610.56 $623.02 $623.02 
Burundi Bujumbura $177.81 $181.44 $181.44 
Chad N’Djamena    
Djibouti Ambouli $494.32 $504.41 $504.41 
Ethiopia Addis Ababa    
Kenya Nairobi $451.84 $461.06 $461.06 
Mauritania Nouakchott $450.53 $459.72 $459.72 
Uganda Entebbe $651.70 $665.00 $665.00 
Somalia Mogadishu    
Niger Niamey $1,365.14 $1,393.00 $1,393.00 
C. COMPARISON OF COSTS 
An analysis of the costs in sections A and B of this chapter shows that there are 
significant differences in the cost of contractor-provided services when compared to 
those provided by organic military forces. In order to assess these differences properly, it 
is important to understand first their nature and magnitude. Some differences are based 
upon the differences of direct personnel costs while others are attributable to limitations 
of the current contracting process. In this section, I first outline the differences and then 
to show how future planners can capitalize on this knowledge. 
Because of the need to protect the proprietary strategy of Contractor X, it is not 
feasible to offer a line-by-line comparison of the actual costs. I will, in general terms, 
explain the difference in the pricing of the contractor provided engagements and the 
methodology used to determine the military price structure. 
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1. Travel Costs 
Travel costs for the contractor were computed as part of a pricing strategy for an 
ID/IQ contract. The pricing was made to ensure that the contractor would make an 
adequate profit on all contract engagements. Because the contractor was not bidding on a 
specific engagement but on the opportunity to provide service for future engagements, it 
was forced to bid a price that would ensure its costs would be covered regardless of travel 
costs. In addition to not knowing the destination airfield, it is likely that the contractor 
has offices in multiple locations within the United States. It is feasible that the trainers 
could reside in different cities and the origin airfield might not be known to the contractor 
when it proposed its prices.  
The pricing of the military engagements was significantly different in this regard. 
The organization within the U.S. Army that would provide the specific training is 
headquartered at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This allows for 100% certainty of the origin 
airfield. Since I priced already completed training objectives using historical data, the 
destination was also known. This removed uncertainty from the equation and allowed for 
the selection of the most economical tickets. Even with knowledge of the origin and 
destination airfields, the cost of airfare for these engagements climbed as high as 
$5,600.00. It is possible that the contractor was forced to make assumptions that would 
drive the price of its estimated airfare much higher than this. 
Similar arguments can be made for the cost of rental cars to support the training 
teams. Because of restrictions on driving in some countries, the rental of a vehicle 
mandates the hiring of a local driver. In just the 10 countries included in this analysis, the 
cost of hiring a car for a week ranges from $181.44 in Burundi to $1,393.00 in Niger. 
Since the contract was solicited as a fixed price contract and not a cost reimbursable 
contract, Contractor X was again forced to propose a price that would allow for a profit 
despite the wide range of costs incurred for rental vehicles. Three countries do not have 
rental vehicles available. In these three cases, I removed the prices from both the 
contractor’s and military’s pricing strategy. 
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Military pricing of these specific engagements was completed after the training 
had been completed. This removed all the financial risk from the equation. It would be 
difficult to establish a risk premium to include into the military pricing strategy that 
would adequately capture the risk the contractor assumed in pricing its travel costs. 
2. Personnel Costs 
While travel related costs were significant, the largest proportion of cost savings 
came from personnel costs. These personnel costs can be broken down into two distinct 
groups; per diem costs and pay and allowances.  
Per diem costs, like other travel related costs are location based. Because of this, 
they subject the contractor to the same financial risk concerns as the rental car and 
transportation costs. Daily per diem rates varied greatly in the ten countries of this 
analysis. In FY 15, those rates range from $176.00 per day in Niamey, Niger to $410.00 
in Nairobi, Kenya. Further complicating matters is the fact that some countries have 
multiple per diem rates that vary by location and time of year. The Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service publish new rate tables every two weeks. Fluctuations for changes in 
the exchange rates and other world economic events are commonplace. I priced military 
engagements as if they took place on October 1 of each year, using rates published by the 
Defense Finance and Accounting Service, but contractors do not have that luxury. They 
must determine the price they will propose based upon a worldwide average and still 
hope to make enough profit to satisfy their shareholders.  
In addition to the uncertainty of frequently changing per diem rates, the 
contractors are authorized by contract to raise their prices 3.44% each year. This rate 
elevation far surpasses the annual military pay increases for the last several years. Since 
2011, the average military pay raise has been 1.34% with a peak of 1.7% in 2013. For the 
last two years, the raise has been capped at 1.0% (Katz, 2014). This means that contractor 
personnel rates, already higher than uniformed personnel rates, are climbing and continue 
to outpace military rates. Some critics may question if the military rates being used in this 
study are artificially low. Do the rates, as applied in this study accurately capture all the 
overhead costs associated with fringe benefit packages? I believe that these costs are 
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appropriately covered. Proof of this coverage is found in note 3 of the Military 
Composite Standard Pay and Reimbursement Rates. The note says: 
The annual rate billable to Other Federal Agencies recovers additional 
military related health care costs financed by the Defense Health Program. 
The annual billable rate includes an acceleration factor of $10,563 for all 
personnel. Reimbursement of the acceleration factor shall be deposited 
into the Defense Health Program (97*0130). Excludes a per capita normal 
cost of $3,701 for MERHC (Medicare-eligible retiree health care) accrual. 
(Department of Defense, 2011) 
The application of this note shows that I have considered all appropriate personnel 
cost categories. The uniformed personnel costs, because they are specific to each 
engagement, will continue to be much smaller than the contractor. 
Another area for which there is a significant difference between the contractor and 
government pricing strategy is in the handling of the hazardous duty risk premium. U.S. 
military personnel are expected to operate in hazardous areas as a portion of their basic 
job description. For certain areas of the world, the military is authorized to pay its 
members a hazardous duty pay of up to $150. The rules vary for payment depending 
upon the type of orders the personnel are operating under. For the types of engagements 
involved in this analysis, military members are typically sent on TDY orders. Under these 
types of orders, payment is not made until a Soldier has completed 30 days of operations 
in the country. For this analysis, I assumed that each member would be in the country 
long enough to qualify for payment. Even at the highest pay rate of $150.00 per month, 
the cost of this payment is negligible.  
Contractors are paid to assume the risk of a hazardous duty area at a much higher 
rate. In accordance with the contract, Contractor X is authorized a hazardous premium of 
25% of the contract cost. Using a standard training engagement of two instructors for two 
weeks, the cost of the hazard premium could be as much as $25,557.00. This would be 
more than $50,000.00 for the month. This premium far exceeds the uniformed cost of 
300.00 for the same level of service.  
The contract for these training engagements was awarded as a fixed price 
contract. This strategy forced the contractor to price the engagements with the most 
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expensive scenario as a distinct possibility. This includes flights to a remote airfield, in a 
country that has no rental vehicle industry or requires the use of a local driver and is 
listed as a hazardous area. Pricing strategies must include the opportunity for the 
contractor to make an adequate profit. This reality means that contracted engagements 
will be more expensive than military engagements. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Given the data provided in Chapter IV, I was able to compare the costs of 36 
training engagements for which Contractor X provided services. In all 36 engagements, 
the price of contracting for these services was significantly higher than if the services had 
been provided by uniformed military personnel. The summation of the results is included 
in Table 7. A detailed breakdown of the cost for military provided services has been 
placed in the Appendix. It is important to note that this study only looks at the financial 
considerations and not the true economic costs associated with conducting security 
assistance operations. Decisions on the employment of military force, even in a training 
capacity, should never be made strictly based upon financial considerations. Contracting 
for training services is an important tool for security cooperation officers to understand. 
The successful employment of contractors is an important force multiplier for the 
combatant commander. Understanding the financial aspects is one small part of the 
equation. 
Table 7.   Comparative Cost of Contractor versus  









Niger 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $98,397.36  $25,725.72 ($72,671.64) 
Uganda 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $85,425.00  $27,755.68 ($57,669.32) 
Uganda 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 $52,320.40 ($101,277.32)
Uganda 2 Eng 1 Week 13 $70,797.18  $15,473.32 ($55,323.86) 
Uganda 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 $52,320.40 ($101,277.32)
Burkina 
Faso 
1 Eng, 1 
Trans 
1 Week 14 $66,176.00  $15,053.02 ($51,122.98) 
Burundi 2 Eng 1 Week  14 $69,409.00  $16,093.02 ($53,315.98) 
Burundi 2 Eng 1 Week  14 $69,409.00  $16,093.02 ($53,315.98) 
Burundi 1 Eng 1 
Trans 
2 Weeks 14 $96,468.00  $26,536.04 ($69,931.96) 
Chad 2 Eng 3 Weeks 14 $146,385.00 $42,342.00 ($104,043.00)
Kenya 2 Eng 3 Weeks 14 $117,108.00 $43,441.18 ($73,666.82) 










Mauritania 2 Eng 2 Weeks 14 $96,468.00  $27,355.44 ($69,112.56) 
Niger 2 Eng 4 Weeks 14 $142,573.00 $49,330.00 ($93,243.00) 
Uganda 2 Eng 2 Weeks 14 $115,458.00 $28,506.00 ($86,952.00) 
Burkina 
Faso 
2 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $121,137.00 $38,211.46 ($82,925.54) 
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,457.00 $25,618.48 ($89,838.52) 
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,457.00 $25,618.48 ($89,838.52) 
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $142,226.00 $25,618.48 ($116,607.52)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,493.00 $25,618.48 ($92,874.52) 
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,521.25 $25,618.48 ($92,902.77) 
Burundi 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,492.50 $25,618.48 ($92,874.02) 
Djibouti 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,521.25 $28,790.42 ($89,730.83) 
Djibouti 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $118,492.50 $28,790.42 ($89,702.08) 
Ethiopia 1 Eng 6 Weeks 15 $111,816.00 $79,580.80 ($32,235.20) 
Ethiopia 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $94,794.00  $28,441.60 ($66,352.40) 
Mauritania 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $91,642.00  $26,901.04 ($64,740.96) 
Niger 1 Eng 1 Year 15 $591,213.00 $326,801.80 ($264,411.20)
Niger 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $94,817.00  $25,777.60 ($69,039.40) 
Niger 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $94,817.00  $25,777.60 ($69,039.40) 
Niger 2 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $121,137.00 $36,819.40 ($84,317.60) 
Uganda 2 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $115,458.00 $28,471.60 ($86,986.40) 
Uganda 1 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $243,403.50 $41,081.40 ($202,322.10)
Uganda 1 Eng 3 Weeks 15 $243,403.50 $41,081.40 ($202,322.10)
Uganda 1 Eng 2 Weeks 15 $52,679.00  $28,471.60 ($24,207.40) 
Chad 2 Eng 4 Weeks 16 $152,551.00 $52,079.20 ($100,471.80)
 
Security assistance is a complex operation involving the whole of government. 
There are costs associated with the presence of U.S. military forces on foreign soil  
that contractors may not have to struggle with. The presence of Soldiers or Marines  
in Mogadishu, Somalia, would lead to increased security requirements, as well as 
diplomatic efforts to ensure their safety. It is anticipated that contractors are financially 
rewarded for the risk associated with operating in such an environment. Current 
personnel laws make it impossible to compensate military members adequately at the 
same rate. Furthermore, even if it was possible to reimburse members adequately for the 
risk, the potential costs associated with the kidnapping or injury of a Soldier or Marine 
far outweigh the costs of the same risk to a contractor. Future researchers need to develop 
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a model that will properly account for the political risk of using military personnel in lieu 
of contractors to determine if it is economically beneficial to continue to the practice. 
In addition to the cost of risk, the opportunity cost associated with a smaller 
military force needs to be properly figured into the evaluation. The senior 
noncommissioned officers that would be utilized as trainers of foreign military forces are 
a relatively low-density asset within the military services. Each security assistance 
mission they perform is time spent away from their primary responsibility of training 
U.S. personnel. In a time of dwindling resources and reduced end strength, it is vital that 
we use military personnel appropriately. Future researchers should attempt to monetize 
those opportunity costs and include that computation into a full economic comparison of 
security cooperation engagements. 
One possible way to mitigate the contractor’s elevated cost is to change the 
contract type from a fixed price to a cost reimbursable type contract or a contract of 
mixed type with some CLNs fixed price and some cost reimbursable. By making the 
travel costs and per diem cost reimbursable, the risk would shift from the contractor to 
the government. This would significantly reduce the location specific cost risks and 
ultimately reduce the cost of the procured services.  
The primary question this research examined is are there significant cost savings 
that can be achieved through the contracted delivery of training to foreign militaries as a 
part of the overall U.S. strategy of security cooperation? 
From a financial point of view, there are no cost saving opportunities from 
contracting training engagements under the provisions of 120/2282 within the 
USAFRICOM AOR. These finding might be significantly different in other AORs that 
have a more robust infrastructure and are not subject to the hazardous area premium that 
are prevalent across the African continent.  
Other economic considerations were out of the scope of this article that future 
researchers should examine before concluding that contracting is not a feasible solution 
for these training engagements. 
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The secondary question this research examined is it possible to measure the 
efficiency of training programs from a security cooperation standpoint? 
Efficiency, defined as providing the same level of training at a lower cost can be 
determined from a financial point of view. Monetarily organic military forces can deliver 
the training at a significant savings to the U.S. government.  
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APPENDIX. 






















Niger 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $98,397.36 2 2 $3,610.33 $14,441.32 $300.00 $3,326.12 $4,928.00 $2,730.28 $25,725.72 ($72,671.64)
Uganda 2 Eng 2 Weeks 13 $85,425.00 2 2 $3,610.33 $14,441.32 $200.00 $2,990.96 $8,820.00 $1,303.40 $27,755.68 ($57,669.32)
Uganda 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 2 4 $3,610.33 $28,882.64 $200.00 $2,990.96 $17,640.00 $2,606.80 $52,320.40 ($101,277.32)
Uganda 2 Eng 1 Week 13 $70,797.18 2 1 $3,610.33 $7,220.66 $200.00 $2,990.96 $4,410.00 $651.70 $15,473.32 ($55,323.86)
Uganda 2 Eng 4 Weeks 13 $153,597.72 2 4 $3,610.33 $28,882.64 $200.00 $2,990.96 $17,640.00 $2,606.80 $52,320.40 ($101,277.32)
Burkina Faso 1 Eng, 1 Trans 1 wk 14 $66,176.00 2 1 $3,601.00 $7,202.00 $300.00 $3,316.00 $3,612.00 $623.02 $15,053.02 ($51,122.98)
Burundi 2 Eng 1 Week x 5 14 $69,409.00 2 1 $3,601.00 $7,202.00 $200.00 $5,450.00 $2,618.00 $623.02 $16,093.02 ($53,315.98)
Burundi 2 Eng 1 Week x 5 14 $69,409.00 2 1 $3,601.00 $7,202.00 $200.00 $5,450.00 $2,618.00 $623.02 $16,093.02 ($53,315.98)
Burundi 1 Eng  1 Trans 2 wks 14 $96,468.00 2 2 $3,601.00 $14,404.00 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $1,246.04 $26,536.04 ($69,931.96)
Chad 2 Eng 3 wks 14 $146,385.00 2 3 $3,601.00 $21,606.00 $200.00 $4,828.00 $15,708.00 $42,342.00 ($104,043.00)
Kenya 2 Eng 3 wks 14 $117,108.00 2 3 $3,601.00 $21,606.00 $200.00 $3,032.00 $17,220.00 $1,383.18 $43,441.18 ($73,666.82)
Mauritania 1 Eng 2 wks 14 $47,096.00 2 2 $3,601.00 $14,404.00 $300.00 $5,600.00 $6,132.00 $919.44 $27,355.44 ($19,740.56)
Mauritania 2 Eng 2 wks 14 $96,468.00 2 2 $3,601.00 $14,404.00 $300.00 $5,600.00 $6,132.00 $919.44 $27,355.44 ($69,112.56)
Niger 2 Eng 4 wks 14 $142,573.00 2 4 $3,601.00 $28,808.00 $300.00 $3,394.00 $11,256.00 $5,572.00 $49,330.00 ($93,243.00)
Uganda 2 Eng 2 wks 14 $115,458.00 2 2 $3,601.00 $14,404.00 $200.00 $3,052.00 $9,520.00 $1,330.00 $28,506.00 ($86,952.00)
Burkina Faso 2 Eng 3 wks 15 $121,137.00 2 3 $3,592.40 $21,554.40 $300.00 $3,316.00 $11,172.00 $1,869.06 $38,211.46 ($82,925.54)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $115,457.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($89,838.52)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $115,457.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($89,838.52)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $142,226.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($116,607.52)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $118,493.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($92,874.52)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $118,521.25 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($92,902.77)
Burundi 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $118,492.50 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $5,450.00 $5,236.00 $362.88 $25,618.48 ($92,874.02)
Djibouti 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $118,521.25 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $3,608.00 $9,604.00 $1,008.82 $28,790.42 ($89,730.83)
Djibouti 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $118,492.50 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $3,608.00 $9,604.00 $1,008.82 $28,790.42 ($89,702.08)
Ethiopia 1 Eng 6 wks 15 $111,816.00 2 6 $3,592.40 $43,108.80 $200.00 $2,672.00 $33,600.00 $79,580.80 ($32,235.20)
Ethiopia 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $94,794.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $2,672.00 $11,200.00 $28,441.60 ($66,352.40)
Mauritania 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $91,642.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $300.00 $5,600.00 $5,712.00 $919.44 $26,901.04 ($64,740.96)
Niger 1 Eng 1 yr 15 $591,213.00 1 52 $3,592.40 $186,804.80 $1,800.00 $1,697.00 $64,064.00 $72,436.00 $326,801.80 ($264,411.20)
Niger 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $94,817.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $300.00 $3,394.00 $4,928.00 $2,786.00 $25,777.60 ($69,039.40)
Niger 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $94,817.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $300.00 $3,394.00 $4,928.00 $2,786.00 $25,777.60 ($69,039.40)
Niger 2 Eng 3 wks 15 $121,137.00 2 3 $3,592.40 $21,554.40 $300.00 $3,394.00 $7,392.00 $4,179.00 $36,819.40 ($84,317.60)
Uganda 2 Eng 2 wks 15 $115,458.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $3,052.00 $9,520.00 $1,330.00 $28,471.60 ($86,986.40)
Uganda 1 Eng 3 wks 15 $243,403.50 2 3 $3,592.40 $21,554.40 $200.00 $3,052.00 $14,280.00 $1,995.00 $41,081.40 ($202,322.10)
Uganda 1 Eng 3 wks 15 $243,403.50 2 3 $3,592.40 $21,554.40 $200.00 $3,052.00 $14,280.00 $1,995.00 $41,081.40 ($202,322.10)
Uganda 1 Eng 2 wks 15 $52,679.00 2 2 $3,592.40 $14,369.60 $200.00 $3,052.00 $9,520.00 $1,330.00 $28,471.60 ($24,207.40)
Chad 2 Eng 4 wks 16 $152,551.00 2 4 $3,592.40 $28,739.20 $200.00 $4,828.00 $18,312.00 $52,079.20 ($100,471.80)
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